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PARTIES 
The caption of this case in the Utah Court of Appeals shows 
the names of all parties to the proceeding in the court below. 
Defendant and appellee Salt Lake City Corporation was 
improperly pleaded as Salt Lake International Airport in 
plaintiff's original complaint. Salt Lake City Corporation owns 
and operates the Salt Lake International Airport, so no additional 
party is involved. Salt Lake City Corporation is the actual party 
defendant in interest in this action. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (k) (Supp. 1995). This case 
involves an appeal from a final judgment which was poured-over to 
the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court on January 19, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
because plaintiff's complaint was filed outside the time limit of 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act following plaintiff's notice of 
claim, where plaintiff filed a second notice of claim and attempted 
to file suit within the limit measured from the second notice of 
claim. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case presents a question involving interpretation of a 
portion of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act which imposes a 
notice requirement on claimants as a prerequisite to filing suit 
against a government entity. "The trial court's interpretation of 
a statute is a legal conclusion which [the appellate court] 
review[s] for correctness." Brittain v. State. 882 P.2d 666, 668 
(Utah App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE LAWS 
The interpretation of the following subsections of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act is pertinent to the resolution of the 
issues in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-30-11 (1993) 
(2) Any person having a claim for injury 
against a governmental entity, or against an 
employee for an act or omission occurring 
during the performance of his duties, within 
the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority shall file a written notice of claim 
with the entity before maintaining an action, 
regardless of whether or not the function 
giving rise to the claim is characterized as 
governmental. 
(3)(a) the notice of claim shall set 
forth: 
(i) a brief statement of the 
facts; 
(ii) the nature of the claim 
asserted; and 
(iii) the damages incurred by the 
claimant so far as they are known. 
(b) The notice of the claim shall be: 
(i) signed by the person making 
the claim or that person's agent, attorney, 
parent, or legal guardian; and 
(ii) directed and delivered to 
the responsible governmental entity according 
to the requirements of Section 63-30-12 or 63-
30-13. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1993) 
A claim against a political subdivision, 
or its employee for an act or omission occur-
ring during the performance of his duties, 
within the scope of employment, or under color 
of authority, is barred unless notice of claim 
is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of 
any extension of time granted under Section 
63-30-11, regardless of whether or not the 
function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-14 (1993) 
Within ninety days after filing a claim 
the governmental entity or its insurance 
carrier shall act thereon and notify the 
claimant in writing of its approval or denial. 
A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if 
at the end of the ninety-day period the 
governmental entity or its insurance carrier 
has failed to approve or deny the claim. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 (1993) 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant 
may institute an action in the district court 
against the governmental entity or an employee 
of the entity. 
(2) the claimant shall begin the action 
within one year after denial of the claim or 
within one year after the denial period speci-
fied in this chapter has expired, regardless 
of whether or not the function giving rise to 
the claim is characterized as governmental. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case arose out of injuries alleged by plaintiff/appellant 
Tyrone Busch on a moving walkway at the Salt Lake International 
Airport on April 20, 1993. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Busch delivered notice of claim to Salt Lake City Corporation 
on August 9, 1993. On April 19, 1994, Busch delivered a second 
notice of claim. The complaint was filed in the Third Judicial 
District Court on March 30, 1995. 
The trial court, Hon. Anne M. Stirba, entered its order 
dismissing the complaint on the ground that it was untimely, having 
been filed more than one year and ninety days after the notice of 
claim of August 9, 1993. This appeal followed. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Salt Lake City Corporation requests this Court to affirm the 
Order of Dismissal in its favor entered by the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following material facts were set forth in the memoranda 
filed by the parties in the trial court pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) , 
Code of Judicial Administration, and are undisputed: 
1. On August 9, 1993, Tyrone Busch served on Salt Lake City 
Corporation the written notice of claim required under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13, alleging that 
he was injured on a moving walkway at the Salt Lake International 
Airport on April 20, 1993 (R. 10-11, 16-18, 85-100). 
2. On April 19, 1994, Busch sent a second written notice of 
claim to Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 26, 101-105). 
3. On or about March 30, 1995, Busch filed the instant 
action in Third District Court naming as defendant: "Salt Lake 
International Airport, a Government Agency, doing business in Salt 
Lake City, Utah." A summons was served on Airport Director Lewis 
Miller on April 5, 1995 (R. 1-7, 11). 
4. Salt Lake City Corporation owns and operates the Salt 
Lake International Airport as a division or department of Salt Lake 
City government. The Airport is not subject to suit in its own 
name apart from Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 11, 19-22) . 
The following undisputed facts are established in the trial 
court record: 
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5. Salt Lake City Corporation filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint on April 25, 1995, asserting that the court lacked 
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because Busch 
failed to file his action within the time required under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. A second ground for dismissal was that 
Busch improperly named as defendant Salt Lake City International 
Airport rather than Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 8-9). 
6. Busch filed a motion to amend the complaint (R. 23) and 
submitted a proposed amended complaint correctly identifying the 
defendant as Salt Lake City Corporation (R. 35-39). However, the 
material facts of the date of the accident and the date of filing 
the first notice of claim are not altered in the proposed amended 
complaint. 
7. Salt Lake City pointed out in the trial court that 
plaintiff's motion to amend complaint was futile because the 
proposed amended complaint would be subject to dismissal on the 
same ground as the original complaint, for failure to file within 
one year and ninety days after filing the first notice of claim (R. 
49) . 
8. After briefing and oral argument, the trial court ruled 
that the complaint was untimely. Accordingly, the motion to 
dismiss was granted. The motion to amend was denied (R. 66-68). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The complaint was filed more than one year after the denial 
period had expired following the written notice of claim required 
under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Busch points out that a 
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second notice of claim was filed, and his complaint was filed 
within one year and ninety days after the second notice of claim. 
However, the time for filing suit began to run from the date of the 
first notice of claim. Limitation periods begin to run upon the 
happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of 
action. Upon filing the first notice of claim# the statutory time 
within which the complaint must be filed, began to run. It would 
not be fair or reasonable to allow Busch to benefit from filing a 
second notice of claim, with the result of tolling the limitation 
time between the filing of the first notice and the filing of the 
second notice. 
Busch asserts that his counsel at the time of the second 
notice of claim was unable to verify that the first notice of claim 
filed by prior counsel was done properly. Therefore, Busch argues 
he should be excused from the operation of the first notice of 
claim. However, there is no question but that the first notice of 
claim was effective. If Busch's successor counsel had any doubt, 
the proper course of action would have been to file a complaint 
within the time limit after the first notice of claim. Salt Lake 
City was not a party to any of the alleged communication problems 
occasioned by Busch's employment of successive counsel. Salt Lake 
City is entitled to the protection of the statute as it is written, 
which required suit within one year and ninety days after notice of 
claim is filed. Busch's complaint filed after that time limit 
lacked jurisdiction under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT RULED CORRECTLY THAT IT LACKED SUBJECT 
MATTER JURISDICTION OVER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM BECAUSE THE 
COMPLAINT WAS FILED OUTSIDE THE TIME LIMIT OF THE UTAH 
GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Busch alleges that he was injured on April 20, 1993. He filed 
the written notice of claim required under Utah Code ann. § 63-so-
il and 13 by serving it on August 9, 1993. 
If at the end of ninety days after filing of a claim, the 
governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the claim, the 
claim shall be deemed to have been denied. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
14. A claimant must begin a civil action within one year after 
denial of the claim or within one year after the denial period has 
expired. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15. 
There is no evidence that this notice of claim was ever 
approved. If it was deemed to have been denied at the end of the 
ninety-day approval period, Busch's complaint was required to have 
been filed within one year after the end of the ninety-day approval 
period, or by approximately November 7, 1994. The complaint was 
not filed until March 30, 1995, five months later. 
Full compliance with the notice of claim requirement is a 
jurisdictional requisite to the right to maintain a civil action 
against a governmental entity. Scarborough v. Granite School 
Dist.. 531 P.2d 480, 484 (Utah 1975); Warren v. Provo City Corp., 
838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) (claim against Provo city for operation 
of Provo City Airport barred for failure to file timely notice of 
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claim); Yearslev v. Jensen. 798 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1990) (variance 
from statutory requirements was not allowed). 
The filing of a second unnecessary notice of claim on August 
14, 1994, does not alter the time limits under the first notice of 
claim. 
Busch points out that his counsel filed a second notice of 
claim on April 14, 1994, and his complaint was filed within one 
year and ninety days after the second notice of claim. 
This argument ignores established rules that the general law 
dealing with statutes of limitations applies to notices of claim 
under the Act, and a cause of action accrues and the relevant 
statute of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action. The Governmental 
Immunity Act provides for two statutes of limitation: First, a 
claim must be filed within one year. Second, the claimant then has 
one year after denial or the end of the denial period within which 
to begin an action in district court. With respect to the second 
statute of limitations, the "last event necessary" is the filing of 
the notice of claim. Having filed the first notice of claim 
through his own counsel, Busch cannot later ague that the notice 
should not have been given legal effect. When the first notice was 
filed (and deemed denied ninety days later), the one-year 
limitation for filing a complaint began to run. Essentially, Busch 
argues that by filing a second notice of claim, he should be 
allowed unilaterally and retrospectively to toll the limitation 
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time between the filing of the first notice and the filing of the 
second notice. 
Busch argues that he knows of no law which bars him from 
filing multiple claims within the statutory time limits. This may 
be true, but it is a much different matter to argue that the Court 
should overlook the running of a statute of limitation simply 
because Busch has filed a second, redundant, and unnecessary notice 
of claim. 
General analysis relating to statutes of limitations is 
appropriate to the filing of a notice of claim and the subsequent 
filing of suit. For example, § 63-30-11(1) states that a claim 
arises when the statute of limitations that would apply in a 
private party action begins to run. Thus, the statute itself 
refers to statutes of limitations when explaining the provisions of 
the Act. Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has applied general law 
dealing with statutes of limitations to notices of claim under the 
Act. O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs. . 821 P.2d 1139, 1141 
(Utah 1991). More recently the court stated that the notice of 
claim provisions in the Act "operate as a one-year statute of 
limitations in cases brought against" the government. Warren v. 
Provo Citv Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1128 (Utah 1992). 
Relating to statutes of limitations, Utah law provides that "a 
cause of action accrues and the relevant statute of limitations 
begins to run *upon the happening of the last event necessary to 
complete the cause of action . . . .,lf Id. at 1128-29, citing 
Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). The Governmental 
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Immunity Act is somewhat unique because it provides for two 
statutes of limitations. First, a claim against the government is 
barred unless the claimant files a notice of claim within one year. 
Second, the claimant then has one year from the government's denial 
to begin the action in district court. Thus, with the "first" 
statute of limitations (in which claimant has to file a notice of 
claim), the "last event necessary" is the accident giving rise to 
the claim in the first place. However, with respect to the 
"second" statute of limitations (in which claimant has to file suit 
after the denial of a claim) , the "last event necessary" is the 
filing of the notice of claim. See Warren. 838 P.2d at 1128 
(notice of claim provisions operate "as a one-year statute of 
limitations"). 
When Busch was injured on April 20, 1993 he had one year from 
that date to file a notice of claim. His first notice of claim was 
filed on August 9, 1993 in a timely manner. Busch then had one 
year and ninety days from that filing to bring suit because filing 
his (first) notice of claim was the "last event necessary" to 
accrue the cause of action. When he filed his first notice of 
claim, the one year statute of limitations referred to in Warren 
started running, and expired approximately November 7, 1994. 
Plaintiff's complaint dated March 30, 1995, was five months outside 
the statute of limitation. 
Like the Governmental Immunity Act, the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act contains a filing requirement that acts as a 
compulsory condition precedent that must be satisfied before a 
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plaintiff can bring an action. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to 78-
14-16 (1991); Malone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132f 133 (Utah 1992). The 
Malpractice Act requires that to bring an action, a prospective 
plaintiff in a medical malpractice suit must serve a notice of 
intent to commence an action on a prospective defendant at least 
ninety days before the plaintiff brings the suit. The statute of 
limitations is two years. A plaintiff also must file a request 
with the Department of Business Regulation for a prelitigation 
hearing. Although this panel review hearing is nonbinding, it is 
a "compulsory condition precedent to initiating litigation." Id. 
Although not directly on point, Malone provides a useful 
analogy because it demonstrates that statutes of limitations will 
not be tolled by prelitigation filings. Plaintiff argued that her 
multiple requests for a prelitigation panel review tolled the 
statute. The trial court granted defendant7s motion for summary 
judgment based on a determination that the action was not timely. 
Id. at 134. Affirming, the supreme court stated that Malone failed 
to act timely in filing for an extension of the time in which the 
panel would retain jurisdiction over her claim. Because her claim 
was defective, the statute of limitations did not toll. Id. at 
135. By analogy, filing a second notice of claim is not sufficient 
to alter the one-year statute of limitations that began running 
when Busch filed his first notice of claim. 
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POINT II. 
THE FIRST NOTICE OF CLAIM WAS PROPERLY FILED AND SERVED. 
Busch apparently contends that the first notice of claim may 
have been defective, and therefore the time limits should run from 
his second notice of claim. However, there is absolutely no 
question on the record that the first notice of claim was 
sufficient. 
The record is clear that the first notice of claim complied 
with the statutory requirements of § 63-3 0-11 (R. 85-87). Further, 
the first notice of claim was served properly. The record contains 
the constable's proof of service on the Salt Lake City Recorder (R. 
88) and on the Salt Lake City Attorney (R. 96) and on Salt Lake 
City Corporation by serving Ken Cowley, City Recorder (R. 100). 
In Bischel v. Merritt. 278 U.A.R. 29 (Utah App. 1995), this 
court held that filing a notice of claim with Salt Lake County was 
accomplished by service of the notice of claim on a responsible 
person in the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. Further, the 
City Recorder is the person specified to receive personal service 
of process under Rule 4(e)(6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Busch argues that the August 9, 1993, notice of claim was not 
effective to commence the time period within which suit must be 
filed (one year beyond the ninety-day denial period, U.C.A. § 63-
30-14 and 15) because that notice of claim was not filed with both 
the Attorney General and the agency concerned as required by 
§ 63-30-12. 
12 
However, § 63-30-12 and the requirements therein apply only to 
claims against the State or its employees. Claims against Salt 
Lake City Corporation as a municipal corporation are governed by 
the separate and different requirement of § 63-30-13 pertaining to 
claims against a political subdivision or its employees. Under § 
63-30-13, notice of claim must be filed "with the governing body of 
the political subdivision." Once that was accomplished on August 
9, 1993, filing of the notice of claim was complete and the denial 
period began to run. 
There is no requirement that claims against political 
subdivisions such as Salt Lake City Corporation be filed with more 
than one office, nor that such claims be filed with the State 
Attorney General's office. In fact, there would be no sense in 
pursuing a claim against a city by filing a notice of claim with 
the State Attorney General. 
Therefore, Busch's reliance on Lamarr v. Utah State Dept. of 
Transportation. 828 P.2d 535 (Utah 1992) is misplaced. That case 
involved a claim against a State agency under § 63-30-12. Filing 
the notice of claim against the Attorney General and the agency 
concerned was required under the terms of that section. However, 
the Lamarr case did not involve the requirements of § 63-3 0-13 
pertaining to filing of notice of claim against a political 
subdivision which would apply in the instant case. Section 63-30-
13, which applies in the instant case, does not require filing of 
notice of claim on more than one entity. Filing is complete when 
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the notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision. 
Lamarr sued both the Utah State Department of Transportation 
and Salt Lake City, 828 P.2d at 536. Summary judgment for the City 
was affirmed on substantive grounds which did not involve the 
notice of claim, 828 P.2d at 540. The requirement to file notice 
of claim on the Attorney General and the agency concerned is 
discussed in the Court of Appeals opinion only with respect to the 
State agency, and not with respect to Salt Lake City. 
Busch points to confusion arising from the transfer of his 
file from previous counsel to present counsel. Yet Busch fails to 
demonstrate that any such confusion could not have been avoided by 
the simple solution of a telephone call or letter to clarify 
matters between previous counsel and new counsel. This is 
especially true where the grounds for possible confusion were 
minimal. The file from previous counsel did in fact show proof of 
service of notice of claim on Salt Lake City Corporation. Further, 
no such confusion was caused by or attributable to Salt Lake City 
Corporation so its rights under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act 
remain unaltered by issues between plaintiff's counsel. 
Also, any possible uncertainty on the part of Busch's second 
counsel could have been remedied by filing the complaint within the 
time limit under the first notice of claim. The time allowed for 
filing the complaint did not expire until November 7, 1994. 
Busch's second counsel had the file from at least April of 1994, 
when the second notice of claim was filed. Consequently, after 
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being retained and obtaining the file, successor counsel had at 
least seven months within which to file a complaint in the time 
allowed after the first notice of claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court did not have jurisdiction over Busch's 
complaint because it was filed beyond the limitation period after 
the filing of the first notice of claim. The second notice of 
claim did not alter the running of the statutory time period. This 
Court should affirm the order dismissing Busch's complaint. 
Dated this / day of February, 1996. 
109050bc 
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